





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


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TRANSLATIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
(FOUO 12/79)

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ALGERIA

DUTCH AID, COOPERATION REPORTED

Gas Liquefaction Plant

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 Mar 79 p 561

[Text] In a letter to Parliament dated 20 February, the Dutch minister of the Economy, Mr Gijsbert Van Aardenne, announced that the Low Countries will lend Algeria \$125 million to help finance the Arzew gas liquefaction plant if West Germany grants the Algerian authorities a loan of equal value.

SONATRACH had requested a loan of 250 million florins (\$125 million) from private Dutch banks. These banks would not agree to the loan unless the State Enterprise for the Insurance and Financing of Exports agreed to cover the risks involved in the operation.

Algeria and the Low Countries are parties to a tentative contract which provides for the delivery of 4 billion cubic meters of liquefied gas a year for 20 years, it is recalled by The Hague. This contract, whose implementation is to commence in the 1980's, will be definitively signed when Algeria has obtained the financing needed to enlarge the Arzew gas liquefaction plant.

Housing and University

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 Mar 79 p 561

[Text] An agreement was signed on 22 February in Algiers between the Algerian national enterprise ECOTEC [National Office for Economic and Technical Studies] and the Dutch Bredero International company, to create a temporary "joint and several" group for the purpose of fully funding the construction of 2,000 units of housing and the 10,000 student university, with its accessory equipment, at Tizi-Ouzou.

Construction of the 2,000 housing units will start next June and will be completed in 30 months. Construction of the university structures will start in January 1980 and be completed in 1984.

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A Dutch bank will finance all the foreign exchange requirements of the projects, which are estimated to be 60 percent of their total cost.

We recall at this time that the Algerian minister of Housing and Construction had established as one of his essential policy guidelines the participation of foreign enterprises with national enterprises in the form of temporary joint and several groups.

In accordance with this policy, ECOTEC concluded the above-mentioned agreement with Bredero as part of its ambitious multi-year plan, which includes 16,000 housing units of the 100,000 unit program to be initiated in 1979 and several universities throughout the country: University of Tizi-Ouzou (10,000 students), university centers of Sisi-Bel-Abbes and Batna (4,500 students each), and three technological institutes at Constantine and Kroub.

Electric Power Plant

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 Mar 79 p 561

[Text] The Dutch Thomassen Holland B.V. company of the Rijn-Schelde-Verolme group has received an order from Algeria for a complete 550 megawatt gas turbine electric power plant. The value of the order is 276 million florins. It is Thomassen's second order from Algeria within a short time.

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IRAN

KHOMAYNI REPORTED SHOCKED BY REALITIES

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 24 Feb 79 p 79

[Article by Jerome Dumoulin]

[Text] Still more than the Tehran leftists Khomeyni's No 1 concern is the South, where the Toudeh controls the oil workers.

"Being in Tehran these days," Yasser Arafat exclaims, "is for me like being in Jerusalem." Flanked by Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan and Vice Prime Minister Ibrahim Yazdi, the PLO leader, beaming, poses in front of the Palestinian flag. A few hours later, he will be taking possession of the former Israeli mission on one of the capital's elegant avenues.

"The Iranian Revolution has completely upset the area's strategic balance," Arafat declares, rendering homage to "our Iman, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni." Tuesday he is making a pilgrimage to Meshed, Iran's holy city. Paradoxically, Arafat, who for a long time proclaimed himself a partisan of a secular Palestinian state, is now lining up under the banner of the most militant Islam. And, moreover, on the side of Iranian Shiism. He thus risks stretching his relations with Arab governments from Iraq to Algeria. But he is also weighing the advantage of being able, henceforth, to gamble between two silent partners: Saudi Arabia and Iran. Not to forget a supplementary benefit: strengthening his relations with the South Lebanon Shiites.

The PLO head no longer makes any mystery of the bonds which unite him to the Tehran revolutionaries. But he hurls a warning to his Fedayeen's and

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Moudjahiddin admirers: "One man only," Arafat says, "represents the Iranian people and all militants: Ayatollah Khomeyni."

The revolutionary youth will not be wheedled by these nice words. Too many things are giving it cause for anger in the process of strengthening Khomeyni's power.

First, the army. The leftists would like to see it dismantled from top to bottom and rebuilt on a "popular basis." Next, the government. "A team of old men," "the lower middle class": the expressions are not gentle. A Fedayeen exclaims: "For the Bazargan followers and associates, the revolution is terminated. Not for us." Lastly, the media. The militants, this time supported by the liberals, are denouncing Sadeq Ghotbzadeh, former spokesman of Neauphlee-Chateau, now television head. "He is carrying on a censorship which is worse than that of the former regime," the employees state, threatening to resume the strike.

Contested on their left, Khomeyni and Bazargan alternate wielding a stick and holding out a carrot. "If the leftists cause trouble," the prime minister says, "I shall crush them." The ayatollah goes one better: "I shall not permit anarchy." The Imam's propaganda committee blurt out the strong statement: "They are communists."

In the written press, still free, leftists, communists, democrats and ethnic and religious minorities again find themselves side by side. This is true particularly in the daily, AYANDEGAN, whose circulation has multiplied in a matter of weeks. One of the editors in chief summarizes its position: "We are against a single party of God; we respect Khomeyni, but we see a court forming around him leading him to dictatorship."

The ayatollah also knows how to unload ballast. In the case of the army, he quickly retracted a certain number of appointments which were contested. He decided upon a massive purge, particularly the physical liquidation of the generals most in the public eye in the former regime.

To appease the Tehran youth, the government launched the plan of a national guard: a popular militia which would integrate soldiers, Moudjahiddins, Fedayins--and their weapons now hidden in a safe place.

In the capital, everything was reopened, even the movies. The veil is on the downswing. Enough to vex the ayatollah.

But Khomeyni's big concern is elsewhere. In the South. In the Ahvaz and Abadan area the 30,000 oil workers have not all gone back to work. The members of the union dominated by the Tudeh Communist Party--nearly a third of the personnel, it is said--are demanding the right to intervene in the operation of NIOC, the national oil company. In Ahvaz, a "soviet" of workers dismissed about 10 technical directors. And the Tudeh is allegedly involved in the secessionist difficulties in Kurdistan.

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A State Within a State

Khomeyni is aware of the stakes. While condemning the "traitors" who are carrying on the strikes, he sends the oil workers a letter with a paternal and conciliatory tone. To entice them, the government leader, who cannot play the card of wages and does not wish to play that of self-management, is counting on a renegotiation of the contracts. "Those which are contrary to the interests of the nation will be canceled," a high official states.

Mehdi Bazargan appoints Hassan Nazih, leader of the bar association and long-time foe of the shah, as head of NIOC. This jurist without oil experience is going to restore order in this state within a state--namely, NIOC. The appointment is well received in the Tehran headquarters. In the South it is a different affair. Even if the workers of Agha Jari, the most extensive deposit, offer their allegiance.

"In any case," one of the national company's officials states, "there is unanimity within NIOC not to go back to the 6 million barrels per day level. We shall not exceed 2 million." As Mehdi Bazargan puts it, while intentionally remaining vague: "The level of our exports will rise in stages."

The rocketing of prices on the market will thus be more than a straw fire. For industrial countries the resumption is again put off indefinitely.

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IRAN

CURRENT SITUATION IN IRAN

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 12 Mar 79 p 49

[Article by Kenize Mourad: "The Ayatollah's Anathemas"]

[Text] "The ayatollah is a bulldozer but I am a little car." This is how Mehdi Bazargan, Iran's prime minister, introduced himself during his inaugural address a few weeks ago. Today, people ask themselves if the bulldozer might not flatten the little car. Everything seems to point to that, in any case. From the holy city of Qom, where he had withdrawn in order--it was thought--to let the provisional government do its job, Khomeyni issued directives on the way to run the state and kept up a constant flow of the severest criticisms, totally sapping the prime minister's authority. "You act like one of the ministers of the old regime," he accused him. "You are weak, Westernized, and luxury-minded." In the light of the extreme nature of these remarks, one might ask oneself what the ayatollah's purpose is: to downgrade the present administration and to force it to resign? Or simply to intimidate it so that, until the referendum in any case, it will toe the line. The ayatollah as a matter of fact does not like the challenge which is emerging increasingly day after day in Iran and which is in the process of becoming organized around the National Democratic Front, created last Tuesday by Master Matin Daftary, Mossadegh's grandson.

This front represents the big hope of the noncommunist left. It rallies above all the intellectuals and the self-employed professional men who have been fighting for a change but who reject a new dictatorship and it has sympathy within the government. When, for example, it denounced the trials that were held behind closed doors and the summary execution of former officials of the regime--but also of pimps and thieves--it was tacitly backed by Bazargan who often complained about the "Khomeynistes committees" which arrested and executed their own chief by firing squad. When it defends the rights of women, it is supported by the vast majority of the Iranian women. Although many decided to wear the veil as a political manifestation against the Westernization imposed by the shah, they understand that the choice is left to each woman. And excesses, such as attacks on women not wearing veils in the streets, the raids by young men against girls' high schools to force them to wear the veil, the ban on secretaries to go to work in a wide skirt, their hair blowing in the wind--these are severely criticized.

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Are these excesses perpetrated by excessively zealous religious militants? Not only, unfortunately! Khomeyni--who for a long time had been very evasive on the Islamic republic and especially on the status of women--now, that he is in power, spelled out his thinking as follows: "The women must cover their hair, the nape of the neck, the arms, and the legs." On the issues of divorce and pill, he made contradictory statements--a tactic which he has been pursuing since the start of the struggle and which enabled him to achieve unanimity, with each person hearing what he or she wanted to hear.

On the other hand, on the essential issue, the issue of the referendum which is to take place on 31 March, the ayatollah was quite clear. In the face of the danger represented by the National Democratic Front, which tries to modify the following question: "Are you in favor of an Islamic republic?" To read instead: "Are you in favor of an Islamic democratic republic?" He hurled anathema. "Voting for a democratic Islamic republic would be a sin because the word 'democracy' is a Western notion."

On that score, he publicly disavows his head of government, Mahdi Bazargan who coined the term "democratic Islamic republic," when Khomeyni was still in Paris. Democracy obviously is a notion the ayatollah does not like much. Today he is the big master of Iran. Why should he be stubborn and renounce his vision of a pure and tough Islamic republic? But perhaps he underestimates his fellow citizens from whom he had been away for 15 years. If he forces Mehdi Bazargan to resign, while the latter is presently the only link between the different tendencies, Khomeyni risks finding himself confronted with an even tougher opposition.

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